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'WILLS AND DECEDENTS' ESTATES
into the will ° Subsequent amendments to the trust had to be incorpo-
rated into the will by codicil in order for the pour-over property to pass
according to the terms of the trust as amende. 21
The doctrine of independent legal significance provides in effect that
an inter vivos trust stands independently of a will, and that once the trust
has been referred to in the will, subsequent amendments to it do not have
to be incorporated into the will by codicil in order for the residue of the
estate to pour over into the trust as amended2
JOE H. MUNSTER, JR.
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WILL CONTEST
The contestant in an appropriate action' failed to join, as a party de-
fendant, within the statutory six-month period,2 the son of the predeceased
husband of the testatrix. Under the so-called "half and half" statute3
of Ohio, the son of the predeceased husband, stepson of the widow whose
will was contested, would have inherited the property in the widow's
estate which had passed from his father's estate had the widow died
intestate. Accordingly, the trial of the will contest action was dismissed
on defendant's motion when the evidence showed that the aforemen-
tioned person had not been joined in the action and, hence, a "necessary"
party had not been joined within the requisite six-month period.4
An interesting aspect of the instant case is found in the plaintiff's
argument that a prior will of the testatrix was in existence which would
become effective if the will which was the subject of this action was
declared invalid. In this way, the plaintiff sought to show that in-
testacy would not result from the invalidation of the contested will and,
therefore, the stepson of the testatrix would not stand to inherit under
the "half and half" statute.5 The court gave this argument short shrift,
stating that "... . an unprobated will is wholly inoperative in Ohio for
any purpose whatever."' In any event, said the court, title to the property
which would, in case of intestacy, pass to the stepson of the widow on
her death would vest at such time "... . subject to being divested at a later
date,"' in the event for example, an effective prior will would be found.
20. OHIo REV. CoDE § 2107.05; Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d
381 (1944).
21. Koeninger v. Toledo Trust Co., 49 Ohio App. 490, 197 N.E. 419 (1934). If the trust
amendment was not executed with the requisite formality of a codicil, only the property origi-
nally in the trust fund was distributed according to the amendment.
22. See 1 Scorr, TRusTs § 54.1-.3 (2d ed. 1956). For a discussion of Ohio Revised Code
section 2107.05 in relation to the Ohio Mortmain statute, see Note, The Ohio Mortmain
Statute - A Need for Reform, p. 592 infira.
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LOST WILLS
In the case of In re Estate of Simon8 an application for probate of a
lost will was filed under the provisions of Ohio Revised Code section
2107.27. It was undisputed that a will had been validly executed by the
decedent some three years prior to his death. Evidence was introduced
showing that a thorough search of decedent's home did not reveal the ex-
istence of the will, although other personal papers were found.
The court pointed out that where a will has at all times, been in the
exclusive control of the decedent, the fact that such will is not found at
the death of the decedent ". . . gives rise to presumption that the will was
revoked."9 Therefore, the party claiming under the "lost" will has the
burden to ". . . prove that... [the will] was not revoked, by clear and
convincing evidence."'" The court ruled, in the instant case, that the
burden of proof was not met and dismissed the application for probate.
ADMINISTRATION
Debts of Administration
The will involved in the case of In re McKitrick's Estate" provided
that "just debts and funeral expenses be paid out of [the estate]." At-
torney's fees, in this case, were paid by the recipient of certain non-pro-
bate property to defend against asserted additional liability under the fed-
eral estate tax predicated upon the inclusion, in the taxable estate, of the
non-probate property.
The representative of the estate applied for instructions so as to de-
termine whether the attorney's fees should be paid from the estate's assets
as a cost of administration. The court pointed out that, generally, the
burden of federal estate tax on non-probate property did not fall upon the
probate estate but, rather, upon such non-probate property. 2 The will
1. Kluever v. Cleveland Trust Co., 173 NXE.2d 183 (Ohio Cr. App. 1961).
2. OHIo REv. CODE §§ 2741.01-.09. Section 2741.02 states: "All the devisees, legatees, and
heirs of the testator, and all other interested persons ... must be made parties to an action
under section 2241.01 of the Revised Code."
3. OHIo REv. CODE § 2105.10.
4. The application of the principle of the "half and half" statute to a will contest action was
commented on by this author in a prior year. See Aronoff, Survey of Ohio Law - Wills and
Decedents' Estates, 11 WEsT. RES. L. REv. 444 (1960).
5. Kluever v. Cleveland Trust Co., 173 N.E.2d 183, 184 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. 177 N.E.2d 92 (Ohio P. Ct. 1961).
9. Id. at 94-95.
10. Id. at 95 (Emphasis added.).
11. 172 N.E.2d 197 (Ohio P. Ct. 1960).
12. See In re Estate of Gatch, 153 Ohio St. 401, 92 N.E.2d 404 (1950).
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provision to pay debts in the instant case did not, said the court, serve to
alter this general rule, especially in view of the fact that the available
personalty in the probate estate would be "... insufficient... to discharge
an additional large obligation of federal estate taxes on non-probate as-
sets."'" The absence of a source in the probate estate for such additional
tax payments supported, said the court, the view that the testator could
not have had "... an intention to burden the probate estate with the non-
probate taxes."' 4
Since the avoidance of federal estate tax on the non-probate property
did not result in a benefit to the probate estate, the attorney's fees in
question were held not to be costs of administration and, hence, not pay-
able from the assets of the probate estate.
Waiver of Rights to Administer an Estate
In an interesting but rather unique case, 5 the Probate Court of Co-
lumbiana County was confronted with the following factual situation:
the son of the intestate decedent waived in writing his rights to admin-
ister his father's estate and consented in writing to the appointment of a
Mr. A. J. Brown, who was not related to the decedent, as administrator of
the estate; thereafter the son filed a motion requesting appointment of
himself as administrator and seeking to set aside the appointment of
Mr. Brown.
Upon a hearing of the motion, the son renounced his former waiver
and consent and stated that he did not desire the said A. J. Brown to ad-
minister the estate. The court found specifically that no fraud or deceit
was involved in the securing of the original appointment.
The court approved a prior decision upholding the right of with-
drawal of a similar waiver and consent, where such withdrawal took
place prior to the actual appointment." In the instant case, the appoint-
ment of Mr. Brown had already taken place, and Letters of Administra-
tion had been granted. However, no action, with regard to the admin-
istration of the estate, had been taken by Mr. Brown prior to the filing of
the motion to set aside his appointment. The court set aside the original
appointment on the grounds that ". . . the law favors the placing of
administration of estates.., first in the hands of the family of the de-
cedent.""' In appointing the son of the decedent as the administrator of
the estate, the court took pains to note that its decision "... . is limited...
to the facts of the case, i.e., that there has been no action in the estate
13. In re McKitrick's Estate, 172 N.E.2d 197, 199 (Ohio P. Ct. 1960).
14. Ibid.
15. In re Estate of Garvin, 175 N.E.2d 551 (Ohio P. Ct. 1961).
16. In re Estate of Welch, 29 Ohio L. Abs. (P. Ct. 1939).
17. In re Estate of Garvin, 175 N.E.2d 551, 552 (Ohio P. Ct. 1961).
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other than the naked appointment."' 8  The court added, obviously as
dictum, that its decision would have been in favor of retaining the
original administrator had actual administrative steps begun, since, in
such situation, the son would be "... estopped from withdrawing his
waiver and consent."19
Statutory Period for Filing Claims Against an Estate
The law pertaining to the four-month period for filing claims against
an estate was scrutinized in a recent decision of the Ohio Supreme Court.2"
In this case the claimant corporation knew of the death of the decedent
and her residence address. The corporation, however, did not realize that
the street upon which the decedent had resided was partially in Cuyahoga
County and partially in Geauga County. Claimant assumed, without in-
vestigation, that the decedent's residence had been in Cuyahoga County,
whereas she had actually resided in Geauga County. The records of
Cuyahoga County alone were checked as to the appointment of a personal
representative of the estate. Before the claimant corporation became
aware of its mistake, more than four months had passed after the appoint-
ment of the personal representative in the Probate Court of Geauga
County. The claimant's petition for authority to present its claim was
allowed by the Geauga County Probate Court, and this decision was af-
firmed by the court of appeals.
Ohio Revised Code section 2117.07 provides that a court may author-
ize the presentment of a claim after the statutory four-month period has
elapsed if ". . . the claimant did not have actual notice of the decedent's
death or of the appointment of the executor or administrator in sufficient
time to present his claim within the . . ." statutory period. The claimant,
in the instant case, relied upon arguments of statutory construction and
judicial interpretation. These arguments failed to secure a favorable
opinion from the supreme court, which by a bare majority (including a
concurring opinion) reversed the lower courts and entered judgment for
the defendant administrator.2 '
The claimant's first argument, rapidly disposed of by the court, was
that the statutory section in question should be construed to the effect
that lack of actual notice of either the death or the appointment of the
personal representative would warrant the presentment of the claim after
the statutory period had elapsed. The court's answer to this question of
statutory construction was concisely stated: "The word 'or' is disjunctive,
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Redifer Bus Co. v. Lumme, 171 Ohio St. 471, 172 N.E.2d 304 (1961).
21. Ibid.
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and there is nothing in the context to indicate that it was employed by
the General Assembly in other than its general acceptation." 2
The interpretation placed upon the statute in question in an earlier
supreme court decision 3 provided fuel for the arguments of both the
claimant and the administrator of the estate. In this earlier decision, em-
phasis had been placed in the syllabus and in the opinion on the concept
of "reasonable diligence" in discovering the appointment of a personal
representative, after having actual notice of the decedent's death. Three
dissenting judges in the later case held that "reasonable diligence" had
been shown, particularly in light of the fact that extensive negotiations
were had, during the four-month period, with the insurance carrier of the
decedent for settlement of the claimant's claim against the decedent. The
dissenting judges apparently placed substantial weight on the fact that the
same law firm apparently represented the estate and the insurance carrier.
Although not dearly stated, it would seem that the dissenting judges felt
that the representatives of the decedent and his insurance carrier, by si-
lence on the subject, had permitted the claimant to err in not filing its
claim within the requisite four months.
Judge Zimmerman, the fourth judge to vote for reversal of the lower
court's decision, did so in a concurring opinion which indicated support
of the "reasonable diligence" concept as providing possible exculpation
from the stringency of the four-month filing limitation. However, Judge
Zimmerman, in apparent disagreement with the factual analysis of the
dissenting group, indicated that such diligence had not been shown in the
instant case, as the claimant had ". . . slept on its rights . .,4 and had
shown a ... lack of due diligence."2
DISCLAIMER OF RIGHTS UNDER A WILL
In an interesting recent decision 8 a beneficiary under a will sought
to disclaim and renounce his rights under the will. His action, according
to a judicial "finding of fact," was motivated, at least in part, by a desire
to ".... prevent the United States Government from satisfying its lien 7
against and out of the property which would pass to him under such will.
The federal district court first found that it must look to the law of
Ohio in order to determine whether the putative beneficiary had any
"property" to which the federal tax liens could attach. The court then
22. Id. at 474, 172 NXE.2d at 306.
23. In re Estate of Marts, 158 Ohio St. 95, 107 N.E.2d 148 (1952).
24. Redifer Bus Co. v. Lumie, 171 Ohio St. 471, 476, 172 N.E.2d 304, 308 (1961) (con-
cutring opinion).
25. Id. at 476, 172 N.E.2d at 307.
26. United States v. McCrackin, 189 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Ohio 1960).
27. Id. at 634.
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concluded that, under Ohio law, a beneficiary under a will is not bound
to accept a gift under a will and that the motivation for a rejection of
such gift is immaterial, unless there is fraud or collusion present. The
United States attorney argued that the beneficiary's motive in renouncing
his legacy was to defraud the United States and that such "fraud" made
the renunciation improper and voidable by the court. The court, in ren-
dering judgment against the United States, held that the actions of the
beneficiary did not constitute a "fraud" under the terms of the applicable
Ohio law, since there were no false representations made by the benefi-
ciary to the United States Government which were relied upon by the
latter.
CONSTRUCTION
When is an absolute bequest in fee simple not what it appears to be?
In the case of In re Will of Iles28 the will of the testatrix provided for
the creation of a life estate for her husband in certain property providing
that all such property remaining at the life tenant's death was to pass
".... absolutely and in fee simple .. ." to the son of the testatrix. How-
ever, the testatrix added to the apparently unequivocal grant in the im-
mediately succeeding clause the following language: "... . in trust, with
authority to my Executor... to pay to my son from the income or prin-
cipal of my estate.. ." a monthly sum of $75, and such further amounts
as might be needed for "... . medical and hospital expenses." After the
death of the son, the testatrix's will directed, "... if there is any residue
from my estate, I give, devise and bequeath all of my estate to my heirs
and next of kin."
The surviving husband elected to take against the will and thus ac-
celerated what was left of the remainder interest in the son. Confronted
with the question of the nature of the remainder interest, the executor
filed an action for construction of the will and for a determination of
heirship. The son of the testatrix argued that his remainder interest was
that of full ownership in fee simple absolute.
The court agreed that, as a general rule, "... a fee, once given, can-
not be cut down by other provisions of the will ... a remainder cannot be
engrafted upon a fee."29 However, the court noted, a clause subsequent
to a clause purportedly granting a fee simple estate may, in effect,
"lessen" the previous apparent grant if the language used in the subse-
quent clause "... is as clear, plain and unequivocal as that in the first
grant. 3
0
The question of construction presented to the court was obviously
28. 175 N.E.2d 781 (Ohio P. Ct. 1960).
29. Id. at 783.
30. Ibid.
[VoL 13:3
WiLLs AND DECEDENTS' E STATES
one dependent upon a determination of the "intention" of the testatrix.
The court's concern with this "intention" was dear in its statement that
"it was plainly the intention of the testatrix to create a spendthrift trust
for the benefit of her son."31 The court correlated its finding of inten-
tion with the relevant case law by finding that "... . the language creating
the trust here is as dear, decisive, plain, and unequivocal as that in the
first grant."32 It is submitted by this writer that the most important con-
sideration supporting the court's decision was the close proximity of the
"trust" language to the "fee simple" granting dause.
ADEMPTION
The testator, in the case of Bishop v. Fullmer," had specifically de-
vised the farm on which he resided. After making the will, the testator
was adjudged incompetent and a guardian was appointed. Prior to the
testator's death the guardian sold the realty which was specifically de-
vised. At the death of the testator the sole asset of his estate was money
remaining from the proceeds of the sale of the realty.
Instructions from the court were sought by the executor as to the
proper distribution of the estate assets. The probate court, relying prin-
cipally on the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in the case of Bool v.
Bool, 4 held that the specific devise had been adeemed, and that since the
will had no general residuary dause, the estate assets should be distributed
as if the testator had died intestate. The court declined to answer, as
irrelevant, an interrogatory as to whether the testator was mentally
competent to make a new will at the time his farm was sold by the guard-
ian or at any time thereafter until his death.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded, directing the lower court
to consider the testimony on mental competence and to answer the in-
terrogatory submitted. 5 The reviewing court recognized that the gen-
eral rule of ademption is: if the subject of a specific bequest is extin-
guished during life, such bequest is adeemed and no property will pass
thereunder. However, the court indicated that, in its view, if the testator
did not have testamentary capacity at the time of the sale by the guardian,
an ademption should not result. The underlying question, not directly
touched upon by the court, is the relevance of intention to the doctrine
of ademption by extinction. Although the general rule leaves no room
for inquiries as to intention, it would seem that such an inquiry is properly
made in cases such as the Bishop case.
GEORGE N. ARONOFF
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. 112 Ohio App. 140, 175 N.E.2d 209 (1960).
34. 165 Ohio St. 262, 135 N.E.2d 372 (1956).
35. Bishop v. Fulmer, 112 Ohio App. 140, 175 N.E.2d 209 (1960).
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